Domain Registration Policy Strategies and the Fight against Online Crime

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
Carnegie Mellon University




Which domain registration policies could be useful in the fight against online crime?

- 1. Background, motivation and related work
- 2. Policy analysis and promising proposals
- 3. Game theoretic analysis of one policy proposal


Ecosystem



Motivation: Malicious Registrations



Motivation: Malicious Registrations



Related Work

Detection and Blacklisting

- Reputation Antonakakis et al. 2010
- Detection Szurdi et al. 2014
- Prediction Hao et al. 2016

Studies Related to Policies

- Registrar-level intervention Liu et al. 2011
- Spam economics Chachra et al. 2014
- Security metrics for TLDs Korczynski et al. 2017

Related Work

Detection and Blacklisting • Reputa Detection depends on registration

- Detection Szurdi policies and vice versa
- Prediction Hao et al. 2016

Studies Related to Policies

- Registrar-level integration Systematic high-level
- Spam economics (
- Security metanalysis of multiple policies

The WHOIS Debate

2001 O First congressional hearing on WHOIS	Security	Privacy
05 Operational Point Of Contact	Intellectual Property - Copyright & Trademark	Spam, Phishing and Scam
	Law enforcement - Online crime	Registrant Privacy
	Security researchers - Domain ownership - Notify domain owners	Freedom of speech
	Regular Users - Look up domain owner	

O General Data Protection Regulation

The WHOIS Debate

2001 O First congressional hearing on WHOIS

2005 Operational Point Of Contact

Security

Intellectual Property - Copyright & Trademark

Law enforcement

Privacy

Spam, Phishing and Scam

Registrant Privacy

High-level analysis of which policy proposals are potentially effective against malicious registrations

Regular Users - Look up domain ownei

2015 O Registration Directory Service (Whois 2)

2018 O General Data Protection Regulation

Policy Framework

- Effect on the number of malicious registrations
 - Effect on the profitability of the illegal activity itself
- Cost to benign registrants
 - Sensitive Registrants!
- Effect on the income of ICANN, registries, and registrars
 - And how they are motivated to adopt
- Effectiveness of policy depending on the rate of adoption

Policy 1: Anti-squatting

- Lexically distinctive features
- Remove known squatting domains
- Harden new squatting registrations
 - What the purpose of the domain name will be?
 - Stricter identity verification
 - Security Deposit
 - Monitor these domains
- Minimal effect on benign registrants
 - Low false positive rate classifiers exist
- Useful even if only one registry adopts it

Policy 2: Incentivizing Registries and Registrars

• Increase fee for registries and registrars with high abuse ratio

• Decrease fee for low abuse ratio


• Only affects bad registrars and malicious registrants

• DNSSEC example: registrars get discount if domains are signed

Policy 3: Anti-bulk Registration

- Malicious registrants need a lot of domain names
- Most benign registrants do not need a lot of domains, except
 - Speculative registrations
 - Defensive registrations
 - Hosting providers/website developers
- Currently bulk registration is rewarded
 - Instead we want to penalize it
- Increasing pricing per domain owned
- Stricter identity verification against Sybil attacks
 - Unusual combination of document + correct validation

A Game Theoretic Model



Strategies

- Set Pricing Function
- Set Identity Validation Method

- Select number of domains to buy
- Select number of fraudulent identities to use


Utility Functions

Registry utility = registration fees $-\rho * cost of online crime$

Registrant utility = value of domains -registration fees -cost of id. verification -cost of fraudulent identities


 ρ - how much a registry is affected by online crime

Effects on Typosquatting




Price = αn^{β} α: Base price n: Number of domains registered **β**: Exponential pricing Θ: Cost of identification λ : Cost of fraudulent identities

Effects on Typosquatting




Effects of Fraudulent Identity Costs



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Effects of Fraudulent Identity Costs



Game Summary

• Policy: exponential pricing + strict identity verification

• Most malicious registrations could become economically non-viable

• Synergy between detection and registration policies is important

Conclusions

• Developed a framework to analyze policies

• Found three promising policies

• Policies + detection -> drastically decreased malicious registrations

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